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What constitutes an intention to commit a criminal offence has proven to be a notoriously difficult 
concept to define.1 The issue as to whether the accused intended the consequences of the prohibited act 
or omission constituting the criminal offence charged in the indictment is a question of fact for the jury 
to determine based on the evidence tendered at trial in addition to the trial judge’s charge to the jury. In 
the absence of a clear statutory definition of intention in the criminal law it is imperative for trial judges 
to instruct juries in accordance with clear judicial guidelines. However, the jurisprudence of the English 
and Irish superior courts pertaining to the meaning of intention, and in particular indirect or oblique 
intention, has generally been regarded as unsatisfactory with the result that trial judges have 
insufficient guidelines when instructing juries.2 
This comment evaluates the jurisprudence of the superior courts on the meaning of intention in 
the criminal law.3 It suggests that the guidelines formulated by the superior courts hitherto are not 
definitive and may lead to confusion when trial judges instruct juries on the meaning of intention, thus 
necessitating statutory reform. 
 
Constructing the mental element of criminal responsibility 
As a general rule, the criminal law stipulates that before an accused can be convicted of a criminal 
offence the prosecution authorities must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the prohibited act or 
omission (actus reus) coincided in law and time with a culpable state of mind (mens rea). The mentes 
reae of most criminal offences in descending order of seriousness are: intention (which is the most 
culpable mental state), recklessness, criminal negligence, and knowledge. In the prosecution of result 
crimes the issue as to whether the accused intended the consequences of the prohibited act has been 
most problematic in the construction of criminal responsibility. 
The accused will rarely admit that he intended to perform the act, or made the omission, 
constituting the criminal offence charged in the indictment.4 Whether or not the accused intended the 
consequences of his unlawful transgression may be ascertained from a consideration of the facts 
pertaining to the commission of the offence tendered in evidence during the course of the criminal trial. 
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As a general proposition of the criminal law, the accused is deemed to have intended the natural and 
probable consequences of his voluntary acts, especially when the evidence tendered at trial establishes 
that the accused had foreseen as a virtual certainty that the particular consequence would occur, 
regardless of whether he desired it. 
Intention has not been sufficiently defined by statute and its meaning therefore has been 
distilled from the jurisprudence of the superior courts.5 It is the common-sense meaning of intention 
that coincides with what most people consider is an intention to do something, that is, the accused’s 
‘aim, objective, or purpose’.6 The fact that the accused does not desire a consequence which he has 
brought about is not decisive, nor is it relevant that he thinks it unlikely that the consequence of the 
unlawful act would occur. There need not be a decision in the ordinary sense of the word; a fleeting 
realisation by the accused of the prohibited consequences may suffice.7  
Many criminal offences specify intention as the mental element, that is, the accused intended to 
produce specific consequences from the prohibited act or omission.8 Most of the case law that 
examined the meaning of intention in the criminal law pertains to the offence of murder, which is 
concerned with the subjective state of mind of the accused. The House of Lords has considered what 
state of mind would be sufficient to constitute intention, in addition to cases where the accused had 
acted with the specific purpose of killing or causing serious injury to the victim. The crucial factor in 
the offence of murder is whether the accused intended to kill or cause serious harm to the victim. For 
such crimes of consequences, also referred to as result crimes, it is not so much the act done but the 
result produced by the accused’s unlawful acts that is decisive.9  
 
Direct and oblique intention 
The criminal law has made a distinction between direct intention (purpose intent) and indirect or 
oblique intention (foresight intent). The accused is deemed to have had direct intent when he intended a 
particular consequence of the unlawful voluntary act. Many criminal offences specify intention as the 
mens rea which may be direct or, alternatively, oblique where the prohibited act has consequences that 
were not the accused’s primary purpose. In other words, oblique intention is bringing about another 
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consequence, which although the accused foresaw as a probable consequence of the prohibited act 
claims that he did not intend.10  
The issue of indirect intention pertains to cases where the accused had engaged in objectively 
dangerous conduct but claims that his primary purpose was to achieve something other than killing the 
victim.11 In view of the fact that juries may ‘find’ that the accused acted with intent based on the 
evidence tendered at trial, it is imperative that trial judges have sufficient guidelines when instructing 
the jury on the meaning of intention. However, due to their lack of clarity, judicial guidelines for trial 
judges when directing juries on the meaning of intention have consistently required further refinement 
by the superior courts. 
 
English jurisprudence on oblique intention 
In DPP v Smith,12 the accused while trying to avoid arrest killed a policeman by driving off with the 
victim clinging to the accused’s car. The House of Lords held that the accused was guilty of murder for 
two reasons. First, because death or grievous bodily harm was foreseen as a likely result of the 
accused’s unlawful act. Secondly, the accused was deemed to have foreseen the risk which a 
reasonable person in the position of the accused would have foreseen. The second ground for the House 
of Lord’s decision had been widely criticised as it introduced an objective element in the meaning of 
intention.13 Consequently, the ruling in Smith was effectively reversed by statute. Section 8 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1967 provides a statutory framework for assessing proof of criminal intent: 
 
 A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence: 
(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of its being a 
natural and probable consequence of those actions; but 
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences 
from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances. 
 
Subsection (b) is a legislative instruction to the jury to consider all relevant evidence when deliberating 
on the guilt or innocence of the accused. The jury is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from all the 
evidence adduced during the course of the criminal trial when determining if the accused acted with 
intent at the time the offence was committed. 
The first in a succession of cases to consider the meaning of indirect intention was Hyam v 
DPP.14 The accused poured petrol through the letterbox of a door, stuffed newspaper through it and set 
it alight. Two of the occupier’s daughters died in the fire. The accused claimed to have started the fire 
only to frighten the occupants and that she had not intended to kill anybody. The trial judge instructed 
the jury to convict the accused of murder if the facts established that she knew that it was ‘highly 
probable’ that her act would cause death or serious bodily harm. The accused was convicted of murder 
and the House of Lords upheld her conviction stating that murder is committed by a person who has the 
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intention to cause death or serious bodily harm. To establish the mens rea of murder it was sufficient 
for the prosecution to prove that when the accused performed the unlawful act knowing that it was 
probable that the performance of those acts would result in grievous bodily harm, notwithstanding the 
fact that the accused did not desire to bring about that particular result. Furthermore, in the 
circumstances of this case the jury must have been satisfied that when the accused set fire to the house 
she realised that it was highly probable that one or more of the occupants would suffer death or serious 
bodily harm, and that she had deliberately exposed them to that danger.  
The House of Lords agreed that the accused was guilty of murder as she had foreseen that death 
or serious injury was a ‘highly probable’ result of the unlawful act regardless of whether she desired 
that consequence. Applying this test, a result is intended even though it may not have been desired by 
the accused if it was foreseen as a highly probable result of the unlawful act. While the House of Lords 
had apparently equated foresight of consequences with intention, their Lordships did not formulate any 
definitive guidelines for trial judges when instructing juries on the meaning of intention. 
While the House of Lords by a majority of three to two upheld the appellant’s conviction for 
murder, the majority decision provided diverse reasons for upholding the conviction: ‘foresight of 
probability’; ‘foresight of high probability’; and ‘foresight of a serious risk’ of death or serious injury. 
Lord Diplock and Lord Kilbrandon differed on the basis that intention to cause serious bodily harm was 
insufficient, instead suggesting that there must have been an intention to perform the act which was 
likely to cause death.15 The diversity of judicial opinions pertaining to the meaning of intention 
rendered the ruling in Hyam unsatisfactory as it resulted in a considerable state of confusion and 
uncertainty.  
Hyam was subject to much criticism as the guidelines appeared to have incorporated an extreme 
form of recklessness in the meaning of intention for murder, that is, the accused had acted in conscious 
disregard with a high probability of causing death or serious injury. It appeared that the House of Lords 
had introduced the concept of reckless killing as constituting the mental element for murder, and 
following this decision the mens rea for murder was left in a considerable state of uncertainty. 
However, the House of Lords subsequently retreated from the Hyam guidelines and introduced less 
expansive guidelines on the meaning of intention in the criminal law. 
The guidelines formulated in R v Moloney16 appeared to have narrowed the broad approach to 
the meaning of intention previously adopted in Hyam. Following a drunken party the accused shot his 
stepfather who had challenged him to see who could load, draw and fire a shotgun in the shortest time. 
He may not have realised that the gun was loaded when he aimed at point blank range at his 
stepfather’s head, shot and killed him. When directing the jury, the trial judge stated that they could 
convict the accused of murder if they believed that he had foreseen that some bodily harm would 
probably happen, that is, as a probable consequence of the unlawful act. Lord Bridge stated that if 
specific intent is at issue, then the probability that the consequences of the accused’s transgression was 
foreseen ‘must be little short of overwhelming before it will suffice to establish the necessary intent’.17  
Allowing the accused’s appeal against murder, and substituting a conviction for manslaughter, 
Lord Bridge held that while foresight of consequences belongs to the law of evidence, it is something 
from which intention may be inferred but it is not the same as intention. On this point Lord Bridge 
refused to follow Hyam. It is not foresight of consequences but intention which constitutes the mens 
rea for murder. Lord Bridge also stated that in cases where it might be necessary to direct a jury by 
reference to foresight of consequences, the jury should be directed to consider two questions. First, was 
the death of the victim or serious injury inflicted a natural consequence of the accused’s voluntary act? 
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Secondly, did the accused foresee the consequence of the criminal transgression as a natural 
consequence? If the jury determine both of these questions in the affirmative then it would be proper to 
infer that the accused had intended that consequence. In other words, foresight of consequences is 
evidence from which the jury could infer intention; however it is not the same as intention. 
The House of Lords in Moloney did not equate foresight of consequences with intention. Thus, 
while the accused could have foreseen a consequence of his actions as being inevitable, it did not 
automatically follow that he intended those consequences. Lord Bridge said that a ‘moral certainty’ 
was necessary or in other words a probability which was ‘little short of overwhelming’ of an act that 
‘will lead to a certain event unless something unexpected supervenes to prevent it’.18 However, when 
summing up the guidelines for trial judges he referred to the term ‘natural and probable consequences’, 
in other words a consequence that is virtually certain to follow.19 While Lord Bridge was referring to 
the ‘natural consequence’ test as implicitly including a ‘high probability’ test, these guidelines were 
somewhat ambiguous and had failed to adequately resolve the dilemma pertaining to the meaning of 
intention in the criminal law. However, elsewhere in the judgment it was stated that the prohibited 
consequence should be ‘the probability of the consequence taken to have been foreseen must be little 
short of overwhelming before it will suffice to establish the necessary intent’,20 or ‘virtually certain’.21 
The ruling in Moloney appeared to have formulated a model direction for trial judges when instructing 
juries on the meaning of intention.22  
A year after the Moloney decision, the meaning of intention was again considered by the House 
of Lords in R v Hancock and Shankland,23 where the issue focused on the probability of natural 
consequences that the particular harm would result from the accused’s unlawful acts. Two miners, who 
had been on strike, pushed a concrete slab from a bridge onto a highway which they knew a non-
striking miner was being transported by taxi to his place of work. The slab hit and killed the driver of 
the taxi and the two accused were charged with murder. In their defence, they argued argued that they 
merely intended to block the road and to frighten the non-striking miner and other miners, and had not 
intended to kill or cause serious injury. In accordance with the judicial guidance formulated in 
Moloney, whether death or serious injury was a natural consequence of what was done, the trial judge 
directed the jury to consider the following question:  
 
In determining whether a person intended to kill or to cause really serious injury, you must have regard to all of the 
evidence which has been put before you, and draw from it such inferences as to you seem proper and appropriate. 
You may or may not, for the purpose of considering what inferences to draw, find it helpful to ask: was death or 
serious injury a natural consequence of what was done? Did a defendant foresee that consequence as a natural 
consequence? 
 
Applying these guidelines, intention could be inferred from foresight of consequences of the prohibited 
act. The two accused were convicted of murder and appealed. The Court of Appeal held that the 
Moloney guidelines were defective and misleading, and quashed the murder conviction. On a further 
appeal, the House of Lords agreed that the murder conviction should be quashed, and substituted a 
verdict of manslaughter. Their Lordships emphasised that moral certainty or overwhelming probability 
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was necessary in order to constitute intention.24 Lord Scarman agreed that the Moloney guidelines were 
misleading as they had omitted any reference to ‘probability’ and, further, that the Moloney guidelines 
(between foresight and intention) required clarification. The guidelines necessitated an explanation that 
in cases where there is a high probability of the prohibited consequence occurring it is more likely that 
this consequence was foreseen. If it can be established that the consequence was foreseen, then there is 
a greater probability that the consequence was intended. The House of Lords, affirming the decision of 
the Court of Appeal, also referred to Lord Bridge’s avoidance of any reference to the issue of 
‘probability’, which could be misleading to juries with the result that juries might consider that it has 
little significance and instead ‘concentrating exclusively on the causal link between the act and its 
consequence’.25 The accused’s foresight of probable consequences of his actions may be a determining 
factor. However, the decision as to whether the accused intended the consequences constituting the 
criminal offence rests with the jury based on a consideration of all the evidence tendered at trial and the 
trial judges’ charge to the jury.  
Lord Scarman did not necessarily disagree with the test of foresight of a probability that is ‘little 
short of overwhelming’ as enunciated in Moloney. Furthermore, Lord Scarman opined that in cases 
where an explanation is required, the jury should be directed as to the relevance of probability, 
although it is not necessary to express the issue in terms of a particular level of probability. The more 
probable the result the more likely it is that it was foreseen. This, however, did not provide sufficient 
guidance to trial judges as to the manner in which juries should be directed on the meaning of intention.   
Lord Scarman was of the view that intention should not be equated with foresight of 
consequences, but that intention could be established if there was evidence of foresight. It is for the 
jury to consider whether the accused foresaw a consequence of the unlawful act. If it is necessary to 
instruct a jury on the matter, it should be pointed out that probability, however high of consequence, is 
only a factor, though it may in some cases be a very significant factor to be considered with all the 
other evidence in deciding if the accused intended the consequences of his acts. 
The House of Lords in Moloney declined to formulate a model direction for juries instead 
stating that where an explanation was required the jury should be directed in terms of probability, 
although their Lordships did not express any particular level of probability. The decision is to be made 
by the jury based on the evidence. As a matter of practice, juries often ask probing questions prior to, or 
during, their deliberations on the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is imperative, therefore, that the 
trial judge instructs the jury in accordance with the proper test for determining whether the accused 
intended the consequences of his unlawful conduct. 
The next in a succession of cases to consider the meaning of intention in the criminal law was R 
v Nedrick,26 the facts of which were very similar to those in Hyam. The accused poured paraffin 
through the letterbox on the front door of a house and set it alight, apparently to frighten the owner of 
the house, with the result that an occupant of the house, a young child, died. The trial took place before 
Moloney and Hancock and Shankland were decided by the House of Lords. The trial judge had directed 
the jury that they could find the accused guilty of murder if he knew that it was highly probable that the 
unlawful act would cause serious injury to one of the occupants of the house (foresight of high 
probability). The prosecution challenged the decision on the grounds that it would prevent the jury 
from considering all the relevant evidence in the case pertaining to the issue of intention. The Court of 
Appeal quashed the murder conviction, and substituted a verdict of manslaughter on the basis that the 
trial judge’s direction to the jury based on the Hyam guidelines was incorrect in that it had effectively 
equated foresight of consequences with an intention to kill. Foresight of consequences belongs to the 
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law of evidence and is not part of the substantive criminal law pertaining to the meaning of intention in 
the construction of criminal liability. Lord Lane CJ stated that when a simple direction to the jury as to 
the meaning of intention was not enough, the jury should be instructed to consider that they should not 
infer intention unless ‘death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen 
intervention) as a result of the accused's actions and that the accused appreciated that such was the 
case’.27 If, in the circumstances of the case, it is inevitable that the consequences of the prohibited act 
would result in death or serious bodily harm to the victim, then the inference of intention may be 
irresistible notwithstanding the fact that the accused had not desired this consequence. It is for the jury 
to decide based on the evidence tendered at trial. If a result is foreseen as a virtually certain 
consequence, then the jury may infer that the accused intended that result. The effect of this judicial 
guidance as to what direction should be given to the jury is that a result which was foreseen by the 
accused as virtually certain is an intended result (foresight of virtual certainty test). 
In accordance with the ruling in Nedrick, if the accused did not foresee a consequence as a 
result of the unlawful act, or where he thought that the probability of it was very slight, he cannot be 
said to have intended it. Only in circumstances where the accused foresaw the consequence as a 
virtually certain result of his actions may the jury ‘infer’ intention, regardless of whether the accused 
actually desired it. The test of foresight of virtual certainty, as enunciated in Nedrick, did not present 
any significant difficulties in trial judges’ instructions to juries. 
The meaning of intention in the criminal law was revisited and somewhat clarified in R v 
Woollin.28 The House of Lords held that where oblique intention is at issue then the jury may not find 
intention (for the offence of murder) unless death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certain result of 
the accused’s prohibited act and, further, that the accused had appreciated this. The House of Lords 
approved the model direction in Nedrick with one exception: instead of being able to ‘infer’ intention 
the jury should be entitled to ‘find’ intention from foresight of virtually certain results. The accused had 
lost his temper and threw his infant son on to a hard surface, as a result of which the child sustained a 
fractured skull and subsequently died. The accused was charged with murder and denied that he had 
intended to cause serious harm. On appeal the accused’s conviction for murder was quashed and a 
verdict of manslaughter imposed. Lord Steyn stated that the trial judge should not have departed from 
the Nedrick guidelines and further that the jury had been misdirected by referring to a ‘substantial risk’ 
which had the effect of blurring the distinction between intention and recklessness, and for that reason 
between the offences of murder and manslaughter. Further, the trial judge’s misdirection was 
substantial in that it had effectively broadened the scope of the mental element for murder.29  
Lord Steyn then qualified the guidelines formulated in Nedrick to mean that the jury may ‘find’ 
rather than ‘infer’ that the accused intended the consequences of his actions.30 However, his Lordship 
did not provide an explanation for this change. Lord Hope agreed that the jury should be entitled to 
‘find’ as opposed to ‘infer’ intention, as this would clarify the judicial guidelines. However, while the 
jury is entitled to find intention, they are not obliged to find that the accused acted with intent when the 
offence was committed.31  
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Judicial guidelines on the meaning of intention in the criminal law have not reached the stage 
where intention and foresight of consequences is equated, and the ruling in Woollin did not sufficiently 
clarify the law on indirect or oblique intention. Therefore underlying issues from the seminal cases 
would require further clarification by the House of Lords in due course.32 Thus, in R v Matthews and 
Alleyn,33 the appellants were convicted of murder, having thrown the victim from a bridge into a river. 
The trial judge directed the jury on the issue of intention in the following terms, that the prosecution 
could only prove intent either:  
 
(i) by making you sure that this specific intention was actually in the mind/s of the defendants, or 
(ii) (a) by making you are sure that [the deceased’s] death was a virtual certainty (barring some attempts to save 
him), and  
(b) the defendant whose case you are considering appreciated at the time [the deceased] was thrown off the 
bridge that this was the case, and he then had no intention of saving him, and knew or realised that the 
others did not intend to save him either.34 
 
The two accused argued that this constituted a misdirection because the alternative in (ii) was put as a 
substantive rule of law rather than as a rule of evidence. In dismissing the accused’s appeal against 
conviction, the Court of Appeal held that where the accused had acted deliberately with the 
appreciation of a virtual certainty of death this did not per se constitute an intention to kill, however it 
was evidence from which the jury could infer an intention to kill. Rix LJ delivering the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal pointed out that the current state of the law did not equate the definition of murder 
with a virtual certainty of the prohibited consequences occurring. Furthermore, the Woollin guidelines 
had not established a substantive rule of law, but rather had changed one word in the Nedrick 
guidelines which had been derived from existing law based on Moloney and Hancock and Shankland 
decisions. 
 If the jury was satisfied that the appellants had appreciated that death was a virtual certainty of 
their actions when they threw the victim from the bridge, and also that the appellants had no intention 
of saving the victim from such death, then the jury was entitled to find that the appellants intended the 
victim’s death. If, in the circumstances of the case, the jury is directed to consider whether there was an 
appreciation of virtual certainty of death, as opposed to a lesser degree of foresight, that is, merely 
probable consequences, then the jury would have little to choose between a rule of substantive law and 
a rule of evidence. Where the accused realised that there was not just a highly probable certainty that 
the prohibited act would have a particular consequence, but rather that it was a virtually or morally 
certainty, the issue then is whether the accused’s realisation constituted an intention or whether this 
merely evidence from which the jury may infer or find that the accused had intended to bring about the 
prohibited consequence.  
 In circumstances where the accused is deemed to have had foresight of a virtual certainty that 
death would result from the unlawful act, this is not per se equated with intention. Notwithstanding this 
apparent lacuna in the definition of indirect or oblique intent, the jury is entitled to ‘find’ intention in 
accordance with the evidence tendered during the course of the criminal trial.  
The Woollin guidelines are relevant only where issues of indirect or oblique intent arise in the 
construction of criminal liability. Thus, in R v D,35 Hooper LJ stated: 
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Woollin is designed to help the prosecution to fill a gap in the rare circumstances in which a defendant does an act 
which caused the death without the purpose of killing or causing serious injury, but in circumstances where death or 
serious bodily harm had been a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant's 
actions and the defendant had appreciated that such was the case.36  
 
In all other cases where the offence being prosecuted stipulates intention as the mens rea, the jury 
should be instructed to consider the meaning of intention in the ordinary sense based on the facts 
tendered in evidence.37 Applying the Woollin guidelines in isolation would result in many individuals 
avoiding conviction for murder notwithstanding the fact that the purpose was to kill or cause serious 
injury to the victim. Thus, for example, the accused who shoots and kills the victim could avoid 
conviction for murder if it could be established that the consequence of his actions was not a virtual 
certainty because he was a bad shot.   
 Where the accused brought about a particular consequence that he did not desire, the jury may 
find that he had intent if the consequence of his actions was foreseen as a virtual certainty. This appears 
to have negatived any blurring of the distinction between of intention and recklessness, which appeared 
to have been likely prior to the decision of the House of Lords in Woollin.38 
 
Critique of the House of Lords’ guidelines 
The House of Lords’ guidelines pertaining to the meaning of intention in the criminal law have been in 
a constant state of uncertainty due to the failure by the judiciary to formulate coherent guidelines 
pertaining to the meaning of intention in the criminal law. In Hyam, it was held that foresight of 
consequences of a high probability could be equated with intention whereas in Moloney foresight of 
consequences should not be equated with intention, but rather is evidence from which the jury may 
infer that the accused intended. Hancock and Shankland decided that the Moloney guidelines required 
clarification because of the failure to include the issue of probability. The greater the probability of a 
result, the more likely it is that it was foreseen, and the more likely it is that it was foreseen the more 
likely it is that it was intended the consequences of the criminal transgression. In Nedrick, the Court of 
Appeal held that where foresight of consequences was a virtual certainty, the jury could infer intention. 
The House of Lords in Woollin endorsed the Nedrick guidelines with one important exception, adding 
that instead of being entitled to ‘infer’ intention the jury should be entitled to ‘find’ intention from 
foresight of virtually certain consequences of the accused’s criminal transgressions.39 There is no direct 
connection between foresight of consequences and intention, although the former may be used by the 
jury as evidence to find intent.40 
The judicial considerations of intention in the criminal law have been somewhat inconsistent in 
their approach to the relationship between intention and motive. In some earlier non-murder cases the 
House of Lords appears to have taken motive into account. Thus, in R v Steane,41 the accused during 
the Second World War had entered the German broadcasting service and was accused of doing acts 
likely to assist the enemy. His conviction was quashed by the Court of Criminal Appeal and the 
reasoning of the court has been subject to much controversy. The accused claimed that his only reason 
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38
 Cf. M. C. Kaveney, ‘Inferring Intention from Foresight’ (2004) 120 LQR 81; M. Gorr, ‘Should the 
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 [1947] KB 997. 
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for assisting the enemy was to protect his wife and children whose lives would have been in danger if 
he had refused. However, Lord Goddard CJ stated that he did not have the necessary intention unless 
the jury was ‘satisfied by the evidence that the act complained of was, in fact, done to assist the enemy 
and if there was doubt about the matter, the prisoner was entitled to be acquitted’.42 The accused’s 
purpose was to avoid being detained in the concentration camp; however, he knew that his purpose 
could only be achieved by assisting the enemy. Nevertheless, it was held that he did not have the intent 
to assist the enemy.43 In Gillick v West Norfolk Area Health Authority,44 the House of Lords held that a 
doctor who gave contraceptive advice to a girl under the age of 16 years for medical reasons while 
realising that this would facilitate unlawful sexual intercourse was not guilty of aiding and abetting that 
offence. Lord Scarman stated that the bona fide clinical judgment as to the patient’s health and welfare 
by a doctor negates a guilty mind which is an essential element of aiding and abetting the offence 
unlawful sexual intercourse.45 These decisions may be contrasted with R v Smith,46 where the accused 
was convicted of corruption by offering an inducement to an official although his purpose was to prove 
that the official was corrupt. Likewise, in R v Yip Chiu-Cheung,47 the Privy Council held that for the 
purposes of conspiracy, an undercover drugs enforcement officer had the intention to commit the 
agreed offence (exporting drugs from Hong Kong to Australia), though he was not charged with the 
offence.  
 
Human rights standards 
In a criminal trial the onus is on prosecution authorities to establish the guilt of the accused beyond 
reasonable doubt. It is imperative that judicial guidelines or proposed statutory definition pertaining to 
the meaning of intention in the criminal law complies with Article 6(2) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which provides that ‘[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law’.48 The issue here is that if a trial judge directs the jury 
that they are entitled to ‘infer’ or ‘find’ that the accused intended the results of his unlawful acts, this 
could potentially undermine the presumption of innocence, and might also strengthen the prosecution’s 
case.49 Nonetheless, a trial judge’s direction to the jury in accordance with the judicial guidelines is 
permissive rather than obligatory in that the jury is entitled, but not obliged, to find that the accused had 
acted with intent based on the evidence tendered at trial. 
 
                                                 
42
 Ibid. at 1006. 
43
 Steane had acted intentionally in that he knew what he was doing. However, the court exercised 
clemency arguably for the wrong reasons. He could have pleaded duress, to protect his family, which 
should have been allowed as a defence to the substantive offence charged. 
44
 [1986] AC 112. 
45
 Ibid. at 190–1. 
46
 [1959] 2 QB 423. 
47
 [1995] 1 AC 111. 
48
 See Lavents v Latvia (App. No. 58442/00), 28 November 2002; Barberrá, Messequé and Jabado v 
Spain (1989) 11 EHRR 360. 
49
 See R. J. Allen, ‘Structuring Jury Decision Making in the Criminal Law Cases: A Unified 
Constitutional Approach to Evidential Devices’ (1980) 94 Harv LR 321 at 322 stating: ‘When a judge 
instructs a jury that it may presume the existence of certain unproved incriminating facts from the proof 
at trial of other less incriminating facts, or suggests by comment that the jury may draw various 
reasonable inferences, the effect is to increase the weight of the evidence presented by the prosecution. 
As a result, the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt may be circumvented.’ 
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Proposals for reform in England and Wales 
In view of the uncertainty inherent in the judicial guidelines pertaining to the meaning of intention in 
the criminal law it is imperative that the legislature enact a precise statutory definition.50 The Law 
Commission for England and Wales reviewed the law of homicide and recommended the adoption of 
either of the following statutory definitions.51 
The first model proposed a statutory formulation of intention based on the definition in the Draft 
Criminal Code:52 
 
(1) Subject to the proviso set out below: 
(a) A person acts ‘intentionally’ with respect to a result when he or she acts either: 
(i) in order to bring it about, or 
(ii) knowing that it will be virtually certain to occur; or 
(iii) knowing that it would be virtually certain to occur if he or she were to succeed in his or her purpose of 
causing some other result.  
(2) Proviso: a person is not to be deemed to have intended any result, which it was his or her specific purpose to 
avoid.53 
 
This is based on the Law Commission’s previous attempt to formulate an acceptable definition of 
intention. While this has the advantage of legal certainty and consistency of application, it also presents 
a potential shortcoming in that it may lead to an unduly rigid application.  
The second model suggests a codification of the common law definition as enunciated in Nedrick 
and subsequently refined in Woollin: 
 
 (1) A person is to be regarded as acting intentionally with respect to a result when he or she acts in order to bring it 
about. 
(2) In the rare case where the simple direction in clause (1) is not enough, the jury should be directed that: 
they are not entitled to find the necessary intention with regard to a result unless they are sure that the 
result was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant’s actions 
and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case. 
(3) In any case where the defendant’s chance of success in his or her purpose of causing some other result is relevant, 
the direction in clause (2) may be expanded by the addition of the following phrase at the end of the clause (2) 
direction: 
or that it would be if he or she were to succeed in his or her purpose of causing some other result, and that 
the defendant appreciated that such was the case.54 
The second model would not per se provide a comprehensive definition for the meaning of intention to 
assist trial judges in their charge to the jury, but rather would establish defined criteria for juries to 
consider in their deliberations as to whether the accused acted with intent during the commission of the 
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 See, e.g. A. Khan, ‘Intention in Criminal Law: Time to Change?’ (2002) 23 Statute Law Review 235. 
51
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offence charged. While this proposed statutory definition based on a codification of the judicial 
guidelines presents an adaptable definition of intention, a caveat must be observed in that this could 
result in uncertainty of application. 
Whichever provision is ultimately adopted it must comply with European Convention on 
Human Rights standards and would be susceptible to being declared incompatible with the Convention 
if the right to the presumption of innocence is undermined.55 
 
Intention in Irish criminal law  
The jurisprudence of the Irish superior courts pertaining to the meaning of intention in the criminal law 
has closely followed English developments.56 The relevant statutory provision is s. 4 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1964, which provides that: 
 
 (1) Where a person kills another unlawfully the killing shall not be murder unless the accused person intended to 
kill, or cause serious injury to, some person, whether the person actually killed or not. 
 (2) The accused person shall be presumed to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his conduct; 
but this presumption may be rebutted.57 
 
This provision was enacted in response to the controversial House of Lords decision in DPP v Smith,58 
that is, to exclude an objective test for intention in Irish criminal law.59 
Section 4 of the 1964 Act stipulates that intention is to be judged subjectively, that is, the actual 
state of mind of the accused when the offence was committed. In other words, the question for the jury 
is whether the accused actually foresaw the consequences of his act, and whether the accused foresaw 
objectively is merely evidence which the jury may consider in their deliberations. Furthermore, the 
presumption in s. 4(2) incorporates the issue of probability into Irish criminal law which is particularly 
relevant to cases of oblique intention. 
Section 4 does not, however, define the meaning of intention in Irish criminal law, but rather 
the manner in which it may be proved by the prosecution. All the evidence may point to the conclusion 
that the accused should have foreseen that his conduct would bring about prohibited consequences. 
However, the question still remains whether the accused actually foresaw these consequences.  
The first reported case to consider the meaning of intention was The People (DPP) v Murray,60 
where the accused was charged with capital murder. The Supreme Court, per Walsh J, distinguished 
between intention and foresight of consequences, and held that intent to murder or cause serious injury 
is where the accused had ‘a fixed purpose to reach that desired objective’. Accordingly, the state of 
mind of the accused must have been that he foresaw and willed the consequences of the prohibited 
conduct. Walsh J then stated that: 
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... a person who does not intend to kill and does not intend to cause serious injury but nevertheless does an act which 
exposes others to the risk of death or serious injury would not be guilty of murder when the mens rea required is an 
intent to kill or an intent to cause serious injury.61 
 
This suggests that the accused who deliberately took a risk by performing the prohibited act would not 
be guilty of murder in this jurisdiction. This may be contrasted with the House of Lords decision in 
Hyam according to which a deliberate risk-taker, who in effect had acted recklessly, could be found 
guilty of murder in accordance with the House of Lords guidelines.  
In The People (DPP) v Douglas and Hayes,62 the two accused had been convicted of shooting at 
another person with intent to kill. With regard to the presumption that a person intends the natural and 
probable consequences of their conduct, the Court of Criminal Appeal stated: 
 
… evidence of the fact that a reasonable man would have foreseen that the natural and probable consequence of the 
acts of an accused was to cause death and evidence of the fact that the accused was reckless as to whether his acts 
would cause death or not is evidence from which an inference of intent to cause death may or should be drawn, but 
the court must consider whether either or both of these facts do establish beyond a reasonable doubt an actual 
intention to cause death.63  
 
While foresight of death as a natural and probable consequence of the accused’s criminal transgression 
is not the same as an intention to commit that act, this is evidence from which the jury may infer 
intention 
The ruling in Douglas and Hayes was strongly influenced by the House of Lords decision in 
Hyam, which has since been reformulated, thus rendering the decision in Douglas and Hayes open to 
question. Furthermore, the remarks pertaining to the offence of murder are, strictly speaking, obiter in 
view of the fact that the accused had been charged with the offence of ‘shooting with intent to commit 
murder’.64 Section 4 of the 1964 Act states that the mens rea for murder is an intention to kill or cause 
serious harm, whereas in Hyam the House of Lords included a ‘residual malice’ in that an accused who 
did not intent to kill may nevertheless be found guilty of murder if he knew that the prohibited act 
would probably cause grievous harm. 
In The People (DPP) v McBride,65 the accused had been convicted of a number of counts of 
aggravated assault. The Court of Criminal Appeal said: 
The jury ought to have been told that while there was a presumption that the applicant intended the natural and 
probable consequences of his act, this was only a presumption and could be rebutted, one of the things that they had 
to consider was whether the State had satisfied them beyond reasonable doubt that the presumption had not been 
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rebutted. And in considering that, they had to take into account what the applicant said in his statement. It was for 
them to decide if it affected their view as to whether he had the necessary intent.66  
 
In other words, while the presumption that the accused intended the natural and probable consequences 
of the prohibited act is provided for in s. 4(2) of the 1964 Act, the jury must also consider whether the 
prosecution has established that the presumption has not been rebutted.  
The meaning of intention pertaining to the trial judge’s instruction to the jury was considered by 
the Court of Criminal Appeal in The People (DPP) v Hull,67 where the applicant was convicted of 
murder, having shot the victim through a closed door. His plea of guilty to manslaughter was rejected 
by the prosecution. He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge’s charge to the jury was 
unsatisfactory in that it had contained both legal and factual errors. The issue then centred on the mens 
rea for murder. The trial judge had instructed the jury to consider their verdict in two stages, based on 
the entirety of the evidence:  
 
The first step is to decide what were the natural and probable consequences. Then, if you believe that the natural and 
probable consequences were death or serious injury, that is the first hurdle, but you have to say have the State proved 
that he intended to cause death or serious injury. Even though there may be a presumption that he intended the 
natural and probable consequences of his act, nevertheless the State must show that the presumption has not been 
rebutted.68 
 
Thus, the jury had to determine whether or not the prosecution had established that when the accused 
fired the gun his act was deliberate, not accidental, so as to decide whether the presumption was 
applicable to the circumstances of the case. If the shooting was accidental, this would rebut the 
presumption in s. 4(2) of the 1964 Act. 
The direction in Hull required the jury to decide in the first instance whether the natural and 
probable consequence of firing at the door was to cause death or serious injury. If this was decided in 
the affirmative, then the jury should determine whether this had been deliberate or accidental. The 
Court of Criminal Appeal was satisfied that this was a reasonable direction to the jury. If the jury 
determined that the natural and probable consequences of shooting through the door was to cause death 
or serious injury, the presumption arose that this was the accused’s intention. However, the jury must 
also consider whether this presumption had been rebutted, that is, whether the accused’s act was 
deliberate or accidental. The trial judge was correct in directing the jury to acquit the accused of murder 
if shooting the victim was accidental; in other words, the presumption to cause death or serious injury 
would have been rebutted. The Court of Criminal Appeal was satisfied that the trial judge’s charge to 
the jury did not contain any legal or factual errors and was not in any way unsatisfactory. The trial 
judge had dealt adequately with the jury’s question pertaining to the ‘natural and probable 
consequences’ of the appellant’s unlawful act. Further, the trial judge’s charge was a reasonable way to 
put the matter to the jury for deliberation. Thus, the trial judge’s direction to the jury to acquit if they 
determined that when the appellant had fired the gun it was accidental, and consequently the 
presumption that he had intended to cause death or serious injury had been rebutted, was correct. 
Hull illustrates the importance of taking into account the particular intent required by the 
statutory definition of the offence charged in the indictment. While the accused may have intended to 
pull the trigger intentionally he may not have had the intention to kill or cause serious bodily harm 
when he pulled the trigger. This pertains to the fundamental issue as to whether he pulled the trigger 
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accidentally (inadvertence) or intentionally (advertence). Intention relates to a particular consequence, 
that is, to the specific offence charged, and cannot be established by proving recklessness. 
 
Proposals for reform in Ireland 
In view of the relative scarcity of jurisprudence in Ireland with regard to the meaning of intention in the 
criminal law, it is difficult to draw any definite conclusions. It is not certain whether the English test of 
foresight of virtual certainty has been adopted into Irish criminal law. Notwithstanding this lacuna, it 
appears that intention in Irish criminal law has a broader meaning than its English counterpart. It 
appears that the accused is deemed to have acted with intent where it was his purpose to kill or, 
alternatively, where the killing occurred with foresight of death or serious injury.  
While the abovementioned judicial guidelines pertaining to the meaning of intention in Irish criminal 
law are useful they have failed to provide a model direction for trial judges when instructing juries on 
the meaning of intention in the criminal law. Consequently, the Law Reform Commission of Ireland69 
reviewed the mens rea of murder and recommended the following definition be adopted: 
 
 (1) Where a person kills another unlawfully it shall be murder if: 
(a) the accused person intended to kill or cause serious injury to some other person, whether that other 
person is the person actually killed or not; or 
(b) the killing is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value 
of human life. 
(2) A person acts recklessly with respect to a killing when he disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death 
will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the circumstances known to him, its 
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the 
actor’s situation. 
(3) A result is intended if: 
(i) it is the defendant’s conscious object or purpose to cause it; or 
(ii) he is aware that it is virtually certain that his conduct will cause it, or would be virtually certain to cause 
it if he were to succeed in his purpose of causing some other result. 
(4) The accused person shall be presumed to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his conduct, but 
this presumption may be rebutted.70 
 
The suggestion that the fault element for murder should be extended to include reckless killing, that is, 
extreme indifference to human life, may circumvent the problematic issue of oblique intention in the 
construction of criminal liability, similar to that in the criminal law of Scotland.71 However, 
recklessness suggests a lesser form of criminal responsibility more akin to a charge of manslaughter; 
intention cannot be established by proving recklessness. In this context, it is noteworthy that the 
                                                 
69
 Law Reform Commission, Report on Homicide: Murder and Involuntary Manslaughter, LRC 87-
2008; see also Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Homicide: The Mental Element in 
Murder, LRC CP 17-2001. 
70
 Ibid. at para. 3.78. The Report includes a Draft Homicide Bill to place this proposed definition on a 
statutory footing, which if enacted would repeal s. 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1964.  
71
 See S. Christie, Introduction to Scots Criminal Law (Longman: Harlow, 2003) 43; T. H. Jones, ‘The 
Scottish Law of Murder’ (1989) 105 LQR 516. 
 16
Commission did not recommend that the fault element for murder be expanded to include recklessness 
as to serious injury.72 
Expanding the mental element for murder in Irish criminal law to include recklessness pertains 
to reckless killing by extreme indifference to human life. Thus, for example, where the accused claims 
that he did not intend to kill or cause serious harm to the victim, and that he did not foresee death as a 
probable consequence of the prohibited act, because his actions could be considered as heinous as an 
intentional killer, he may be found guilty of murder.   
While this proposed statutory formulation would assist trial judges when directing juries on the 
meaning of intention, a caveat must be observed in that the statutory definition must not be unduly 
rigid, but rather should permit the jury to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused based on the 
evidence tendered at trial. Furthermore, it would be subject to interpretation by the superior courts and 
may be struck down on grounds of incompatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights.73 
 
Conclusion 
In England and Wales, and in Ireland, the meaning of intention in the criminal law, which 
predominantly concerns the offence of murder, has a relatively narrow definition; certain killings which 
are reckless might be equally as heinous as intentional killings. While the legal meaning of the concept 
of intention remains uncertain, it is evident from the jurisprudence of the superior courts that intention 
pertains to the accused’s object or purpose (purpose intent) or foresight of virtually certain 
consequences of the unlawful act in the case of result crimes (foresight intent). 
A clear concept of intention in the construction of criminal liability has not been distilled from 
the jurisprudence of the superior courts and the criminal law has not reached the stage when foresight 
of virtually certain consequences and intention are equated. Where indirect or oblique intention is at 
issue the jury is entitled to find intention based on foresight of virtually certain consequences 
(evidence) of the unlawful act. However, these concepts are not the same, and furthermore they must 
be clearly distinguished from recklessness which pertains to the accused’s disregard of possible 
consequences. 
Intention and foresight of consequences are distinguished from the concept of recklessness on 
the basis of advertence and inadvertence as to the probable result of the accused’s criminal 
transgression. While some statutory offences are established by proving that the accused acted 
recklessly, intent cannot be proved by recklessness which is a lesser degree of criminal responsibility. 
The meaning of intention in the criminal law remains undefined by statute and judicial 
guidelines thus far lack a sufficient measure of clarity; therefore, issues of incompatibility with 
European Convention on Human Rights standards may arise with regard to the presumption of 
innocence. It is now opportune for legislatures to eliminate the problem of inefficient judicial 
guidelines and the general lack of clarity, obscurity and uncertainty that still exists as regards the 
meaning of the concept of intention in the criminal law. A clearly defined statutory provision would 
ensure a sufficient measure of consistency of approach in the manner that trial judges instruct juries.  
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